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Abstract—This dissertation presents a Distributed denial-of-
service Adaptive ResponsE (DARE) system, capable of executing
appropriate detection and mitigation responses automatically
and adaptively according to the attacks. It supports easy in-
tegration of distributed modules for both signature-based and
anomaly-based detection. Additionally, the innovative design of
DARE’s individual components takes into consideration the
strengths and weaknesses of existing defence mechanisms, and
the characteristics and possible future mutations of DDoS at-
tacks. The distributed components work together interactively
to adapt detection and response according to the attack types.
Experiments on DARE show that the attack detection and
mitigation were successfully completed within seconds, with
about 60% to 86% of the attack traffic being dropped, while
availability for legitimate and new legitimate requests was
maintained. DARE is able to detect and trigger appropriate
responses in accordance to the attacks being launched with
high accuracy, effectiveness and efficiency. The dissertation is
available at http://pubs.doc.ic.ac.uk/VrizlynnThing-PhD-Thesis-
2008/VrizlynnThing-PhD-Thesis-2008.pdf.
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service, Adaptive Re-
sponse System.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, high-profile DDoS attacks over the In-ternet have increasingly been exploited by extortionists,
business rivals and rebels on websites of banking and financial
companies, online gambling firms, web retailers, government
sectors, and even firms providing Internet security services.
The following recent studies and surveys conducted, show the
prevalence of DDoS attacks in the Internet.
• 68,700 attacks against over 34,700 distinct Internet host
targets over a period of 3 years from 2001 to 2004 were
observed in the backscatter study.
• Symantec witnessed an average of 5,213 DDoS attacks
per day between 1st July and 31st December 2006.
• 70 worldwide ISPs ranked the millions of zombie com-
puters across the Internet as the single largest threat fac-
ing network services availability and operational security,
from July 2006 to June 2007. An increase in the types of
activities for which the botnets were employed for, such
as launching DDoS attacks, was observed.
• Cisco Security IntelliShield Alert Manager Service issued
the most alerts for DoS, buffer overflow and arbitrary
code execution threats from January to October 2007.
We studied and analysed existing DDoS attack tools used
by attackers to gain an in-depth understanding of how DDoS
attacks are mounted and their characteristics. An evaluation
of existing DDoS attack prevention, detection and response
mechanisms was also performed to determine how available
techniques handle DDoS attacks and how well they are able
to cope with current DDoS attacks as well as their potential
mutations.
We built a flexible Adaptive Response System capable
of executing appropriate detection and mitigation responses
automatically to adapt to the changing conditions of the victim
and its network during an attack. The system overcomes the
weaknesses of existing mechanisms for handling current and
future variants of DDoS attacks (for example, tweaking attack
characteristics to make attack profiling difficult for defence
mechanisms, spoofing of source addresses, overloading of
servers with seemingly legitimate requests). The Adaptive
Response System should:
• incorporate flexibility for easy integration of future com-
ponents in order to evolve to cater for future changes in
attack objectives and characteristics
• be distributed and scalable to handle the distributed nature
of DDoS attacks
• require no change to the Internet infrastructure which
raise conformance issues
• constitute simple and fast modules with minimal pro-
cessing overhead for detecting and responding to attacks
efficiently
• be implemented as independent management components
which can be deployed in protected computers to reduce
the threat from attack on the Adaptive Response System
itself.
The dissertation also presents another DDoS mitigation sys-
tem, Traffic Redirection Attack Protection System (TRAPS)
[1], designed for the IPv6 networks. We show how TRAPS is
able to provide server protection against DDoS attacks through
virtual relocation using the existing Mobile IPv6 protocol.
Therefore, no change is required to the end-hosts which are
potentially all the Internet nodes.
DARE was implemented and deployed on Emulab to con-
duct large-scale experiments to test the detection and re-
sponses, in terms of correctness in executions, results accuracy,
mitigation speed and efficiency, and protection of legitimate
traffic (ongoing and new).
Section II describes the background work and gives an
overview of the work in the dissertation. Section III covers
our contributions. Section IV describes the DARE architecture
and modules. Experiments conducted are presented in Section
2V, followed by the description of TRAPS in Section VI and
the conclusion is in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND WORK AND DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an insight to the analysis we have
conducted on initial background work in the area of DDoS
attacks and mitigation. We also explain the overview of our
research work.
A. Related Work
We classified DDoS mitigation into three categories, namely
prevention, detection and responses, and studied existing tech-
niques in each category. Although prevention is an important
first line of defence against attacks, we observed that deter-
mined attackers will always try to work around the preven-
tive measures. New attacks will also compromise preventive
measures which have not been prepared to cope with them as
indicated by the current prevalence of DDoS attacks. Thus it is
important to be able to detect and respond to DDoS attacks.
Detection includes signature and anomaly based techniques.
Different types of attacks requires different detection methods
to increase true positives and achieve minimal false negatives,
in particular when selecting the detection parameters, thresh-
olds and normal profiles for anomaly-based detection methods
which have inherently lower reliability than signature-based
ones.
After an attack has been detected, an appropriate response
to handle the attack should be triggered. This could include
traceback to locate the actual source of the attack traffic,
especially in the case of address spoofing, so that further
responses such as filtering or rate-limiting could be performed
nearer to the source to reduce attack traffic propagation.
Different response types also vary in the degree to which
they filter off potential attack traffic corresponding to the
reliability of the detection mechanism and the confidence in
differentiating attack traffic from the legitimate ones.
We also studied existing automated mitigation frameworks.
Among them, EMERALD and COSSACK did not provide an
open architecture, were no longer maintained and supported
limited detection and response modules. DiDDeM supports
congestion detection but relies on signature-based response
only. SNORT and Prelude allow plugins and sensors integra-
tion, respectively. However, SNORT and Prelude mainly sup-
port rule-based or signature-based detection, but not anomaly-
based detection modules.
B. DDoS Attack Bots
In addition, we studied in details the source code of DDoS
attack tools present in four popular bots used by attackers
to launch DDoS attacks [2]. The source code was obtained
from hacker web sites. Such analysis gave us an in-depth
understanding of the attacks’ features and characteristics.
We analysed the tools and discussed the implications of
our findings on well-known DDoS mitigation techniques. For
example, the partial subnet address spoofing for the attack
packets, which retains the source address network prefix,
would compromise ingress filtering. The popular SYN-Dog
detection mechanism would not work correctly as it is possible
for attackers to send out randomised SYN and ACK packets,
imitating the three-way handshake. We also emphasised the
need to acquire an understanding of the attacks before being
able to design more effective and efficient mitigation tech-
niques.
From our study of the DDoS attack bots, we observed that
the most common attacks present in the bots are TCP SYN
and UDP flooding attacks. This observation coincides with the
study by the Arbor Networks Inc. where the surveyed ISPs
reported that these two attack types were the most prominent.
Therefore, we concentrated on the detection and response to
these attacks, as well as considered the effect of their possible
mutations on mitigation techniques.
C. Analysis of Appropriate Responses
We classified DDoS responses as Traceback, Containment,
Reconfiguration, Redirection, Filtering, Ratelimiting, Resource
replication, Legitimacy testing, and Attackers’ resource con-
sumption. As the system performance relies on the individual
components, special care was put into choosing the responses
to design. We analysed and discussed when a response is
appropriate and the reasons to carry out specific actions
under each response type. We considered and decided on the
responses necessary to effectively mitigate DDoS TCP SYN
and UDP flooding attacks, as follow.
Traceback is essential in any DDoS defence system to locate
the point nearest to the attack sources to perform mitigation so
as to prevent attack traffic from propagating to other networks
(including intermediaries). Existing mechanisms require wide
spread deployment on Internet routers and the provision of
an attack signature for identifying attack packets to extract
traceback information. We implemented a novel traceback
mechanism in DARE, Non Intrusive IP Traceback [3], [4] (in
Section IV), which resolves the above-mentioned problems.
Reconfiguration techniques work within the target network
to provide a resilient network in the event of an attack,
by re-routing legitimate traffic and isolating attack traffic.
However, existing methods such as the Secure Overlay Service
only works with previously authenticated clients, while [5]
only works with HTTP traffic. Therefore, we designed a
new reconfiguration mechanism called the Traffic Redirection
Attack Protection System (TRAPS), a standalone system, for
IPv6 networks, in Section VI.
In our system, we consider Redirection as Filtering. Filter-
ing and Ratelimiting are implemented as the response modules
for DARE. However, to ensure correct filtering, we devised
a Bloom-based filter which relies on our Enhanced TCP
SYN Attack detection [6] (in Section IV). Ratelimiting is
also performed only on identified suspicious and attack flows,
detected by our DDoS Attack Detector and Flow Identifier (in
Section IV).
III. CONTRIBUTIONS OF DISSERTATION
The dissertation details our attacks analysis, and design and
experiments of our detection and response modules in DARE
3and TRAPS. The following outlines the contribution of the
dissertation:
• A DDoS Bot Survey to analyse the source code of
the four most popular botnet tools typically used for
carrying out DDoS attacks. We identified and analysed
their characteristics to cater for better understanding of
current DDoS attacks. We proposed enhancements and
mutations, and implemented more powerful attack tools
to conduct tests on our new mitigation mechanisms. This
work is to the best of our knowledge, the first published
study on DDoS Bot attack tools, and will be a useful
resource for the research community working on DDoS
attack mitigation.
• A DDoS Adaptive ResponsE (DARE) System is designed
and built to achieve the goal of establishing a tight
loop of modular detection, decision making and response
components. DARE composes innovative detection and
response mechanisms in the form of a bandwidth moni-
toring module, a traceback module, a TCP SYN detection
module, an adaptive system manager for coordination of
various components, a filtering module and a ratelimiting
module. DARE can work across multiple, distributed
networking devices. The modular approach also allows
for easy modification, tailoring and adaptation of the de-
tection, decision making and response techniques. DARE
stands out from existing frameworks by allowing the
integration of not only signature-based but also anomaly-
based detection and responses.
• A newly Enhanced TCP SYN Attack Detection and
Bloom-based Filtering Mechanism to cater for the po-
tential “mutation” of TCP SYN attacks, which would
not be detected by current techniques, is designed. The
mechanism allows zero false positive rate of filtering,
while protecting ongoing and new legitimate traffic dur-
ing attack occurrence.
• An enhanced DDoS Flood Attack Detector and Attack
Flow Identification Mechanism is presented based on
MULTOPS with enhancements to allow for a speedier
attack detection and a more efficient memory allocation
for the hierarchical data structure it uses. Legitimate
traffic classified into different flows is spared from the
ratelimiting response.
• A novel Non Intrusive IP Traceback technique to identify
actual paths taken by attack traffic by detecting route
anomalies is built and evaluated. It is used to facilitate
tracing of attackers and to carry out further responses on
attack traffic as close as possible to the source in order
to limit attack traffic within intermediate networks. The
technique is non intrusive as no change is required to the
Internet routers unlike existing techniques.
• A Traffic Redirection Attack Protection System (TRAPS)
aimed at next generation IPv6 networks is described.
TRAPS verifies the authenticity of source addresses in
order to detect address spoofing during a DDoS attack. It
then performs adaptive reconfigurations to differentiate
legitimate clients and attackers in order to carry out
mitigation by filtering out attack traffic. It is particularly
useful in IPv6 networks where Mobile IPv6 and its route
optimisation feature are built-in. Therefore, no deploy-
ment is required to the end hosts, which are potentially
all the nodes in the Internet.
In the next section, we describe the DARE architecture.
IV. DARE ARCHITECTURE AND MODULES
In this section, we present the architecture overview of
DARE which is based on the architecture of the EU Diadem
Firewall project in which we were involved.
A. Diadem Firewall
The Diadem Firewall project [7] was an European Union
funded project to develop an architecture that enables an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to protect its own networking
environment as well as the connected hosts and servers of its
customer against network attacks. We were one of the seven
European project partners, and were responsible for the System
Manager (SM) and the Non Intrusive IP Traceback module.
Fig. 1: Architecture Overview of Diadem
Figure 1 shows an architecture overview of the Diadem Fire-
wall. It consists of distributed monitoring elements running the
Versatile monitoring toolkit (VERMONT), which are network
monitors configured to capture and/or aggregate traffic packets.
The traffic packets or flow information is then exported to
the Traffic Flow and Packet Analysis System (TOPAS), a
framework for the reception and real-time analysis of the
network packets and flow information. TOPAS subscribes to
flow information essential for its modules to carry out analysis
to detect various attacks. The existing detection modules in
Diadem consist of the Web Server attack detector and the TCP
SYN attack detector running in parallel within TOPAS.
The Web Server attack detector builds normal user be-
haviour models by monitoring service requests for the server
objects (for example, web pages). A change-point detection
algorithm checks for changes in the browsing behaviour of
the users, to detect Web server overloading attacks. The TCP
SYN attack detector uses the SYN-Dog (SYN-SYN&ACK)
algorithm. VERMONTs at the source networks send infor-
mation on outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK packets
to the TCP SYN attack detector for analysis. In a TCP SYN
attack, the difference between the number of the outgoing SYN
and incoming SYN&ACK packets will be very noticeable.
The Non-Intrusive IP Traceback module was designed and
developed as a TOPAS response module. It is triggered after
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the attack sources. The module depends on flow information
received from VERMONTs to check for route anomalies in the
source and destination IP address pairs. Details on the design
are in Section V.
The external response module is a Firewall, complemented
with a high-speed traffic classification engine implemented on
a PCI FPGA board. When a TCP SYN attack is detected, the
firewall is triggered to drop requests from sources which have
not been seen recently. When a Web Server overloading attack
is detected, the firewall is triggered to perform ratelimiting
on suspicious traffic not matching the normal user behaviour
models.
The System Manager (SM) is the system coordinator. Alert
messages regarding attacks are sent to the SM, which then
dispatches appropriate responses to the response modules, such
as the Traceback module and/or distributed firewall elements.
Results and status information from the response modules are
also sent to the SM for attack status logging.
As seen in Figure 1, two distinct types of inner communi-
cation paths exist. The first path type allows the monitoring
data from VERMONTs to be sent to TOPAS. The second
path type allows the communications of the IDMEF (alert and
response) event messages between the SM, detection modules
and external response modules (residing outside TOPAS).
IDMEF defines an XML message format for intrusion alerts.
The event distribution between the modules is based on the
XMLBlaster publish-subscribe system, where modules sub-
scribe to receive events they are interested in (based on event
topics) from a server. Modules publish events they generate to
the XMLBlaster server which in turn forwards them to those
modules that have subscribed to the type of events. The use
of the XMLBlaster for event distribution allows Diadem to
scale easily when additional detection and response modules,
or even SMs, are added.
The goal of the architecture is to establish a loop of
detection, decision and response actions across multiple dis-
tributed firewall and networking devices, so as to provide a
comprehensive security solution. The architecture also allows
development and deployment of modular network components
to be integrated in an efficient manner. In this way, Diadem en-
sured functional flexibility, as well as scalability of the system.
Additionally, it provides built-in support for traffic flow sam-
pling, aggregating and exporting through VERMONT. With
its open architecture, it also supports the design, development
and integration of both signature-based and complex anomaly-
based detection techniques for DDoS attacks mitigation, as
well as automated response modules, into TOPAS.
Due to Diadem’s architectural advantages and modular ap-
proach, as well as our knowledge of the system, it was chosen
as the basis for the DARE implementation. However, several
modifications and novel additions were designed and imple-
mented within DARE to improve the detection and response
mechanisms in terms of speed and mitigation efficiencies.
We adopt the Diadem architectural structure, VERMONT for
network traffic monitoring and TOPAS for the integration of
our detection and response modules.
B. DARE
Fig. 2: Architecture Overview of DARE
We designed and implemented novel detection modules
for integration into TOPAS, and external response modules
which cooperate better with our new detection mechanisms.
The architecture overview of DARE is shown in Figure 2 to
illustrate the layout of the entire system. The sub-systems and
modules that exist in Diadem are in grey, while the new ones
in DARE are in black.
1) Adaptive System Manager: We built a new Adaptive
System Manager (ASM) for coordinating the events from the
detection modules and response triggering. The SM in Diadem
was written in Java and it supports the alert and response
event coordination between the existing modules in Diadem.
The new ASM was implemented in C++ to improve the
performance speed and to support the coordination between
the new modules, such as triggering further responses like
traceback, triggering filtering of TCP SYN attack traffic at the
exact points returned by the traceback module and triggering
the ratelimiters to probabilistically drop the identified suspi-
cious/attack traffic flow.
2) XML Subscriber and Parser: The XML Subscriber and
Parser module is created in DARE as TOPAS only comes
with a built-in XML Publisher to send out IDMEF alerts.
Previously in Diadem (refer to Figure 1), IDMEF alerts
received by TOPAS catered only for the Non-Intrusive IP
Traceback through the use of a flag in a file (read at preset
interval) to trigger the traceback process. Therefore, without a
subscriber and parser module, IDMEF messages could not be
subscribed to by the detection and response modules within
TOPAS to get loopback alert information, update messages
and system configuration messages. We solved this problem in
DARE by introducing our XML Subscriber and Parser utility
module, which is “shared” by all the modules in TOPAS.
3) Non Intrusive IP Traceback: The Non-Intrusive IP
Traceback is designed based on the rationale that packets
belonging to a particular source-destination pair follow a
relatively static path as routing tables are not updated very
frequently under normal conditions. When an attacker spoofs
a legitimate user’s source address, the packet may pass through
routers which are not on the normal source-destination routing
path and this anomaly can be used to determine the attack
path. Compared to existing mechanisms, our traceback scheme
requires no precise attack signature from the detection mod-
ules, no modification to the Internet infrastructure and no
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the additional burden of the attack path construction, and is
simple and fast. We modified the code of our traceback module
in DARE to process the information forwarded to it through
the new parser utility module.
4) DDoS Flooding Attack Detector and Flow Identifier:
The Flooding Attack detector facilitates the detection of the
prominent DDoS UDP flooding attacks. The design of our
detector and the Flow Identifier is based on MULTOPS but
includes our new enhancements. Our module’s data structure
is organised as a 4-level 256-ary tree to cover the entire
IPv4 address space. Each node in the tree has 2 fields:
incoming packet rate and a pointer to the node in the next
level of the tree. The IP addresses have a common 0-bit, 8-
bit, 16-bit, or 24-bit prefix, depending on the level of the
tree. The root nodes will contain the aggregate packet rates
from address 0.*.*.*, 1.*.*.*, etc. If the incoming packet rate
exceeds a preset threshold for the current tree level, a new
subnode is created on the fly. This form of subnode creation
is termed expansion. When the packet rate drops below a
certain threshold, removing nodes or the entire subtree is
performed and it is termed contraction. Therefore, we are able
to detect flooding attack based on the unusually high incoming
packet rate of particular flows. This allows the isolation of
suspicious/attack traffic flows. As this detection method does
not achieve zero false positive, ratelimiting is triggered as
an appropriate response on the identified flows. Our design
allows a faster flow identification than MULTOPS by reversing
the expansion and contraction order to cater for DDoS attack
detection. Due to the dynamic memory allocation for our data
structure and the logging of only the incoming traffic, we are
able to achieve in excess of over 50% of memory conservation,
compared to MULTOPS.
5) Enhanced TCP SYN Attack Detector and Bloom-based
Filter: While studying the DDoS attack bot tools and the exist-
ing TCP SYN detection mechanisms, we devised a new variant
of TCP SYN attack, which we named the Bot Buddy attack.
This attack uses a peer bot (buddy) to send a SYN&ACK
packet to an attack bot, for each of the SYN packet the latter
sends to the victim. It circumvents the popular SYN-Dog
mechanism, which detects the abrupt rise in the difference
between outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK packets.
The Enhanced TCP SYN detector is a novel mechanism,
which incorporates a Bloom-based hashing technique in the
SYN-Dog detector to allow the detection of both conventional
and Bot Buddy attacks. Instead of counting all outgoing
SYN and incoming SYN&ACK packets, it tracks outgoing
SYN packets and only counts valid corresponding incoming
SYN&ACK packets. Storage of source-destination address
pairs is not required due to the use of Bloom-based hashing on
the addresses. Therefore, space and time efficiency is achieved.
The number of incorrectly validated SYN&ACK packets is
found to be minimal (i.e. < 8 packets after 20 minutes of
attack and 72000 attack packets).
With the Bloom-based addresses hashing entries, it allows
us to differentiate between legitimate and attack traffic (e.g.
entries with only outgoing SYN packet are marked as ‘1’,
entries with both outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK
packets are marked as ‘2’). Therefore, we incorporate a more
effective filter based on these entries to drop attack packets
while protecting legitimate ones.
The reason the Bloom-based filter is at the source network
is due to our Enhanced TCP SYN attack detector being a
source network based detection module, so TCP SYN attack
packets can be isolated and dropped at the point nearest to the
attacker once the Traceback module identifies the locations of
the attack sources.
6) Ratelimiter: Our Ratelimiter module developed in C++,
incorporates the Linux Traffic Control (TC) module. Informa-
tion on the attack flows identified by the Flooding Detector and
Flow Identifier is subscribed and parsed by our Ratelimiter.
The TC rules are then formulated and executed to carry
out ratelimiting. The Ratelimiter is deployed in the protected
target network, where aggregated flooding traffic is detected.
As flooding attack packets are usually seemingly legitimate
packets, it is not feasible to ratelimit such flows at the source
where traffic is minimal (traffic not converged yet). All the
modules in TOPAS run in parallel and are able to detect and
respond to different attacks simultaneously.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We implemented the enhanced attack tools and all the
DARE modules, and evaluated the performance of DARE
through experiments. We concentrated on the two most promi-
nent DDoS attacks: TCP SYN and UDP Flooding. The system
is evaluated based on the following criteria:
• Execution of the appropriate detections and responses in
the situation of different attacks
• Correctness of results (that is, alert event is triggered
only when there is an ongoing attack, Traceback returns
correct results as to the routers forwarding attack traffic
and the Enhanced TCP SYN attack detector compiles the
bloom list correctly for the Bloom-based filters to forward
legitimate requests and filter attack traffic)
• Speed of the attack detection and responses (and returning
of the results in the case of Traceback)
• Ability to mitigate attack traffic
• Ability to protect legitimate traffic (ongoing and new)
We ported DARE to the Emulab machines to carry out
the experiments. Emulab is a large-scale network testbed for
testing networking and distributed systems. It allows the spec-
ifying of arbitrary network topologies, giving a controllable
environment, including PC nodes with full “root” access,
running an operating system of choice.
Using a comprehensive network topology and experimental
scenario including a mixture of attack, legitimate and new
legitimate traffic in different networks, we carried out mul-
tiple sets of experiments on TCP SYN and UDP Flooding
attacks. The results from different sets of experiments were
consistently close and stable. We were able to achieve correct
and appropriate automated execution of the detection and
responses for various attacks. The results and information
returned by all the modules were verified to be accurate.
The TCP SYN attacks were detected within 6 seconds. The
ASM was notified of the attacks within a second. Traceback
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nodes forwarding attack traffic) was completed with the correct
results returned between 2 to 6 seconds. A high percentage
of the total attack traffic (86%) was filtered off. While suc-
cessfully mitigating the attacks, all the legitimate and new
legitimate traffic started during the attacks were fully (100%)
protected.
The UDP flooding attacks were detected with the contracted
attack flows identified within 7 to 27 secs. The Traceback
module was also successful in returning the correct tracing
results from under 1 sec to 2 secs. The Ratelimiters de-
ployed and triggered to perform the attack traffic dropping
also successfully limited the total attack traffic, resulting in
approximately 60% of the attack packets being dropped.
We compared the TCP SYN attack experiment carried out in
the Diadem Firewall project to DARE. Even with a much more
complicated experimental scenario, DARE was able to achieve
a faster reaction time in all aspects of detection, traceback and
response triggering.
VI. TRAPS
Traffic Redirection Attack Protection System (TRAPS) was
invented and implemented as a stand-alone DDoS attack
detection and mitigation system particularly suited to IPv6
networks. In TRAPS, the victim under attack verifies the
authenticity of the source by performing virtual relocations
(i.e. changing of IP address). Corresponding nodes are then
notified of this new “location” of the victim. Attackers spoof-
ing their source IP addresses would not be able to receive
this notification. Attack traffic can then be easily identified
and isolated, with absolute confidence and be dropped, while
legitimate traffic is allowed through. An advantage of TRAPS
has over existing mitigation frameworks, is that the processing
overhead is low due to the simplicity of the approach. It
also requires minimal deployment effort and does not require
modification to the Internet infrastructure. By using Mobile
IPv6, we do not need special software at the correspondents
(Internet end hosts). Experiments to test the feasibility of
TRAPS were carried out in a testbed environment to verify that
it would work with the existing Mobile IPv6 implementation.
It was observed that the operations of each module were
functioning correctly and TRAPS was able to successfully
mitigate an attack launched with spoofed source IP addresses,
while maintaining the core Mobile IPv6 functionality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of the DDoS attack tools provided a useful
resource for understanding how the code was structured and
what design decisions were made by the Botnet authors. Based
on it, we pointed out modifications which could be made to
strengthen attacks and ensured that enhanced forms of the
attacks were used in our experiments. There is a dilemma in
suggesting and publishing suggested new variations and “im-
provements” of attacks. However, our intention is to inform the
research community of the limitations of existing techniques
and we have provided techniques for protection from these
new types of attacks.
We have designed and built DARE, which is a flexible
Adaptive Response System, capable of executing appropriate
detection and mitigation responses automatically according to
the observed changing conditions of the victim and its network
during an attack. It overcomes the weaknesses of existing
mechanisms to handle current and future variants of DDoS
attacks, incorporating flexibility for easy integration of future
components in order to evolve to cater for future changes in
attack objectives and characteristics, and is distributed and
scalable to handle the distributed nature of DDoS attacks.
Large scale experiments were also conducted to demonstrate
its high reliability, effectiveness and speed of detection and
responses.
We also looked into the protection of next generation IPv6
networks from DDoS attacks. We proposed TRAPS which
can be easily deployed, utilising the built-in Mobile IPv6
feature, to verify the authenticity of the source by performing
virtual relocations of the server. Therefore, attack traffic can
be correctly isolated and filtered off, while protecting legiti-
mate traffic. TRAPS was implemented and experiments were
conducted to prove its feasibility.
We have submitted a journal paper on the Non Intrusive IP
Traceback (under review), while work is ongoing on journal
papers submissions detailing analysis and experiments on
the other specific modules in DARE. The Non Intrusive IP
Traceback, and the Enhanced TCP SYN Attack Detector and
Bloom-based Filter have also been submitted to the Tan Kah
Kee Young Inventors Award Competition (under review).
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